One Tron remittance address in Zach’s dataset was already frozen by Tether in December 2025 and the network still moved $3.5M+, so blacklists are only clipping the cash-out leg after a fake contractor has already touched your repo, Slack, and deploy pipeline. DOJ’s June 30, 2025 case showed how fast this jumps from payroll fraud to direct protocol loss: a DPRK dev at an Atlanta blockchain shop modified two smart contracts and stole ~$740k, while another drained ~$175k from a Serbian token company. If your protocol still treats this as an HR/compliance problem instead of a signer-segmentation and CI-hardening problem, you’re giving attackers the cheapest path to multisig, treasury, and upgrade access.

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